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I. INTRODUCTION - THE BEST LAID PLANS

In 1909, Milton Hershey created a charitable trust to build and
operate a school for orphans. To the trust, he gave the stock and,
therefore, the ownership of his candy company. By the late 20th
century, the Milton Hershey School was one of the richest educational institutions in the world, surpassed in endowment in the
United States by only a handful of major universities. In 2002,
the trustees of the trust concluded that good business practice
might call for a more diversified asset base than the stock of a single corporation and prepared to solicit offers for the purchase of a
substantial portion, or possibly all, of such stock.

* Marc S. Cornblatt is a partner at Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP in Philadelphia. He is a 1968 graduate of Harvard College and a 1971 graduate of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School. Bruce P. Merenstein is a partner at Schnader Harrison Segal &
Lewis LLP. He is a 1985 graudate of Brandeis University and a 1998 graduate of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP was counsel to
the Barnes Foundation and the Philadelphia Health Care Trust in the proceedings discussed in this article.
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In 1922, Dr. Albert Barnes established a charitable trust to
maintain a school and gallery in Merion, Pennsylvania to teach
his views about art and art appreciation and to exhibit the collection of paintings that he had acquired and had donated, and would
continue to donate, to the trust. By the time of Dr. Barnes's death
in 1951, the Barnes Foundation owned and displayed one of the
world's finest collections of impressionist and post-impressionist
paintings and other art. By the beginning of the 21st century, the
trustees of the foundation determined that the finances of the
Foundation and the vitality of its continuing operations called for
an expansion of its Board and the move of its gallery to a new, larger, and more accessible facility in Philadelphia.
In 1975, a number of individuals in the Philadelphia health care
community started a corporation that eventually became Philadelphia Health Care Trust to preserve a hospital facility scheduled
to be separated from the University of Pennsylvania and shut
down. By 1995, that organization operated a health care system
that included seven hospitals and a health maintenance organization. By 1999, it had transferred the hospitals and the HMO and
continued as one of the largest health care foundations in the
area. Two years later, it reached an understanding for a process
to conclude its business as a foundation and to transfer its assets
to the health care system of the University of Pennsylvania.
Were these organizations business corporations or entities, their
boards of directors or trustees would have reviewed and decided
on the proposals for changes, sales, or transfers and implemented
their decisions. Assuming that the decisions involved no selfdealing, bad faith, or similar breach of fiduciary duty, no further
approval would have been required for that exercise of business
judgment. The Hershey School, the Barnes Foundation, and
Philadelphia Health Care Trust, however, are not business corporations, and their boards do not have that level of discretion. Instead, they are nonprofit charities and must function in the very
different and very special world of controlling trusts, settlor's intent, charitable purposes, parens patriae, the Attorney General,
and the Orphans' Court.
II. THE PLAYERS
A.

Charities

In Pennsylvania, anyone can form a nonprofit corporation by filing Articles of Incorporation listing any variation of the purposes
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authorized by section 5301 of the Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation law, 1 and asserting that the corporation "is one which does
not contemplate pecuniary gain or profit, incidental or otherwise." 2 Almost everyone who does form a nonprofit corporation or
trust or other organization wants the entity to qualify as a charity
because in most cases only charities can claim exemption from
federal income tax and state real estate and sales taxes. Unlike a
nonprofit corporation, creating a charity exempt from taxes requires a good deal more than a simple declaration of purpose and
intent.
Pennsylvania grants a tax exemption to nonprofit organizations
only if they qualify as "purely public charities." The authority to
exempt such entities first appeared in section 1 of article 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873. The constitution authorized
the General Assembly to "exempt from taxation public property
used for public purposes, actual places of religious worship, places
of burial not used or held for private or corporate profit, and institutions of purely public charity." 3 The current state constitution
contains a similar provision in article VIII, section 2(a)(v), which
provides that the "General Assembly may by law exempt from
taxation: . . .Institutions of purely public charity, but in the case
of any real property tax exemptions only that portion of real property of such institution which is actually and regularly used for
4
the purposes of the institution."
In its first decision applying a "purely public charity" tax exemption, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Library
Company of Philadelphia (founded by Benjamin Franklin and others in 1731) constituted a purely public charity. 5 The court established the modern definition of a "purely public charity" in Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth.6 A little more than a
decade after the decision in Hospital Utilization Project, the state
legislature codified this definition in the Institutions of Purely
Public Charity Act. 7 To qualify as tax exempt in Pennsylvania, a
nonprofit charity must advance a charitable purpose such as relief
of poverty, advancement of education or religion, treatment of disease or the like; operate entirely free from private profit motive;
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 1995).
Id. § 5306(4).
PA. CONST. of 1873, art. 9, § 1.
PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a)(v).
In re Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. 306, 317-18 (1878).
487 A.2d 1306, 1317 (Pa. 1985).
10 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 375 (West 1997).
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donate or provide without charge a substantial portion of its services; benefit a substantial and indefinite class of people who are
legitimate subjects for charity; and relieve the government of its
burden by providing services that the government would be required to provide or that are generally the responsibility of gov8
ernment.
For most nonprofit charities, exemption from federal income tax
derives from § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and requires
that the organization be established and operated for, and fulfill,
an exempt purpose, such as charitable, educational, or religious
functions; assure that none of its income inures to any individual;
not engage in political activity; and not violate public policy. 9 A
federal tax exemption also involves distinguishing between public
charities and private foundations, a significant body of statutory,
regulatory, and case law, and Internal Revenue Service rulings
and interpretations as to what the organizations can and cannot
do under numerous variations of facts and circumstances.
At both the state and federal levels, the recognition of tax exempt status necessary for the right not to pay taxes and the deductibility of contributions involves a reasonably complex application process that must satisfy the Pennsylvania Department of
Revenue or the Internal Revenue Service. While there are exceptions, establishing the recognition of a state or federal tax exemption is not often routine and can be difficult, expensive, and time
consuming.
Although Pennsylvania statutes, rules, and court decisions refer
to charities and charitable status for a number of purposes, such
as jurisdiction, use of assets, diversion of resources, and solicitation of donations, none of these authorities define what makes a
corporation, trust, or other organization a "charity" for any purpose other than exemption from taxes. As a result, organizations
that seek qualification as a charity define their structure, purposes, and operations to meet the requirements of federal and
state tax exemption and recognition standards.
Even when recognized as a charity by the taxing authorities,
however, an organization must deal with a good deal more than
tax rules. It must, among other things, fulfill its charitable mission, devote its assets only to its charitable purposes, and operate

8. See Menno Haven, Inc. v. Franklin County Bd. of Assessment & Revision of Taxes,
919 A.2d 333 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007).
9. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
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under the continuing scrutiny of the Office of the Attorney General and the jurisdiction and control of the Orphans' Court.
B.

Attorney General

As in most states, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania serves
as parenspatriae and has the authority and responsibility to protect, monitor, and enforce obligations to the state and its citizens. 10
In that capacity, the Attorney General looks over the
shoulder of all charities who serve the people of the Commonwealth and can question substantially anything that a charity
does, particularly if it involves a transfer of assets, a change of
purposes, or another fundamental transaction."
Pennsylvania law grants to the Attorney General standing to
intervene and participate in all matters involving charities, charitable bequests and trusts, and cy pres actions. 12 The Supreme
Court Orphans' Court Rules require fifteen days advance notice to
the Attorney General of "every proceeding in the Orphans' Court
involving or affecting a charitable interest.'13 As a result, if it
chooses to do so, the Office of the Attorney General may participate as an observer or active party in any matter involving a charity that comes before the Orphans' Court.
In 1997, to try to support and possibly enhance its role in reviewing and participating in matters before the Orphans' Court
involving charities engaged in health care, the Office of the Attorney General issued a publication entitled General Review Protocol
for Fundamental Change Transactions Affecting Health Care
Nonprofits. The protocol provides for ninety days advance notice
to the Attorney General for information about proposed substantial transactions such as sales, mergers, or joint ventures. It also
sets forth a process for review of the proposal, possible notice to
the public, and response by the Attorney General to the notice. As
the protocol itself provides, however, it is "to be used as a guide by
attorneys and reviewers in the charitable trust & organization
section, and its outside experts." It is not law or a regulation with
the force of law. While the Attorney General can draw conclusions
10. See, e.g., Buck Mt. Coal Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 50 Pa. 91, 99-100
(1865). See also Commwealth Attorneys Act, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 732-204 (1980).
ii.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Coleman, 456 Pa. 163, 168-69 (1974).
12. 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732-204(c) (West 2006) (stating that the Attorney General may intervene in actions involving charitable bequests and trusts); cf. 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7735(c) (West 2006).

13. PA.ORPHANS' CT. R. 5.5"
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and act on the basis of the failure of a health care charity to comply with the protocol, it cannot compel compliance.
Contrary to some popular understanding, as well as the occasional implied position of the Office of the Attorney General,
mergers, sales, transfers, and other fundamental transactions by
charities do not require the advance approval of the Attorney
General, and the Attorney General cannot stop such transactions
without recourse to a court. The Attorney General's real authority
and power in matters relating to charities derives from its standing to participate as a party in interest in all proceedings involving charities.
Any charity that ignores the Office of the Attorney General may
find itself compelled to respond to and deal with the Attorney
General's views or objections in any matter presented to the Orphans' Court. Not surprisingly, courts tend to take very seriously
the position advanced by the Attorney General as the designated
advocate for the state and its citizens.
C.

The Orphans' Court

In Pennsylvania, the court having jurisdiction over substantially anything involving a charity is a division of the Court of
Common Pleas, the state's primary trial level court, known as the
"Orphans' Court." The court began during Pennsylvania's colonial
era as an institution to protect orphaned children and their right
to their deceased family's estate against claims and abuses by
step-parents and others.14 As the modern court system developed,
the court became a type of probate division of the state trial court,
dealing with decedents' estates, trusts, and charities. 1 5 Despite
the changes, the colonial name stuck, and the division remains the
"Orphans' Court."
All issues involving the business, affairs, and activities of charities that call for court review or approval and all challenges to the
way charities conduct their business and spend money require
proceedings before the Orphans' Court. 16 The jurisdiction of the
court covers everything from diversion of assets to deviation of
purposes to cy pres. Because of the specialized nature of the
14.

An Act for Establishing Orphans' Courts, ch. 197, 1803 Pa. Laws 92 (1713); ROSCOE

POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 79 (1940).

15. See Orphans' Court Act of 1951, 1951 Pa. Laws 1163; Orphans' Court Act of 1917,
1917 Pa. Laws 363; Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist., 56 A. 16, 19 (1903); Yohe v. Barnet, 1
Binn. 358, 364 (Pa. 1808).
16. See PA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2156; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 711(21) (West 2005).
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court's jurisdiction and the matters that it considers, proceedings
before the Orphans' Court often tend to be less formal and more
equitable than other actions and proceedings in civil courts. Even
at its most informal and accommodating, however, the Orphans'
Court remains a division of the Court of Common Pleas, and any
charity that requires relief from the court must prove its case to
the court under the scrutiny of the Attorney General.
The special nature of the standards governing charities and the
practice before the Orphans' Court does, however, present at least
one opportunity not usually available in other trial level courts.
As discussed below, the standards governing the requirement for
court approval for certain types of transactions, including particularly matters relating to diversion of assets, can be sufficiently
vague in practical operation as to be difficult to apply to specific
significant transactions. The generally equitable and relatively
permissive nature of proceedings before the Orphans' Court has
led to an increasingly common type of action in which a charity
that does not consider itself bound to obtain court approval for a
proposed undertaking, nonetheless, requests a decree in the nature of a declaratory judgment. The approval is unnecessary, but
puts the Orphans' Court's "seal of approval" on the proposed
transaction or action and protects it from subsequent challenge.
III. ORPHANS' COURT ISSUES FOR CHARITIES
A.

Testators, Settlors, and Intent

A charitable trust derives from a trust instrument established
by a settlor in his or her lifetime or by a will. Settlors describe
what the trust will do and how it will do it in as much or as little
detail as the settlor considers appropriate. The management and
operation of the trust rests with one or more trustees, or a board
or other group of trustees, as the settlor determines, with as much
or as little discretion as the settlor desires to give. Trustees and
boards of trustees are expected to follow the settlor's direction and
intent, and the Orphans' Court is expected to make sure that they
do so.
Strict adherence to a settlor's intent leads to difficulty for one
principal reason-the world changes over time, both in general
and specifically with respect to the issues and activities that concern the trust and the law that governs those issues and activities.
When the world or circumstances change so much that implementing the settlor's directions and intent become impossible, illegal,
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obviously unreasonable, or even extremely unwise, someone must
do something. Since trustees and other private parties cannot
change a trust or a settlor's directives on their own, whoever
chooses to do something to respond must use the courts to implement change.
In some instances, such as older trusts that mandate unlawful
segregation or discrimination, the issues seem obvious even if the
solutions are less simple. In the Girard will cases, for example,
19th century Philadelphia merchant Stephen Girard directed by
his will that his estate be used to establish a school for "poor male
white orphan children." 17 It took nearly fifteen years of litigation
for the courts finally to establish that the racial restrictions under
8
the will were unconstitutional and, therefore, unenforceable. 1
Most cases concerning a change from a settlor's plain or implied
directives or intent present much more complex and difficult issues. For example, does "impossible" really mean physically impossible or is impracticable or even impractical enough? When
does excessive cost rise to impossibility? Is it when there is no
money to make a required payment or when the costs deplete resources beyond reasonable levels? What about directives that
make no sense in the modern world, such as travel instructions
given before the era of automobiles or air travel or directives on
information transfer given before the world of e-mail? What happens when the settlor's apparent general intent for the operation
of a trust conflicts with specific directives because of cost, changes
in technology or law, or other factors?
In some instances, changing circumstances and the passage of
time place the administrative requirements of a trust instrument
or other governing document at odds with the document's basic
purposes and the settlor's intent. For example, if a trust instrument provided that the principal executive or operating officer of
the trust was to be a recognized expert in the appropriate field but
limited the officer's compensation on the basis of standards in effect many decades earlier, it is necessary to have recourse through
the courts to the "deviation doctrine" to vary from the compensation requirements in order to fulfill the basic intent of highly
qualified principal officers. 19 In the Barnes matter, discussed be17. In re Estate of Girard, 386 Pa. 548, 551 (1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
18. See Pennsylvania v. Bd.of Dirs. of City Trusts of Phila., 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1968).
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1) (2003); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7740.3(c)
(2006).
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low, the court applied the deviation doctrine to permit a change in
the administrative requirements of the composition of the Foundation's Board of Trustees and the location of its art gallery in order
to prevent financial collapse and to fulfill Dr. Barnes's intent and
the Foundation's principal purpose with respect to the display and
use of the art collection.
On occasion, deviation is not enough and changing the administrative terms or requirements of a trust document will not make
the impossible possible or permit the fulfillment of the settlor's
intent. For example, when the settler creates a charitable trust to
support a nonprofit institution, such as a hospital, the trust purposes become truly impossible if the hospital changes its ownership or operations and converts to a for-profit business. The same
result obtains when a trust was created to fund an institutional
program that no longer exists or to fight a disease that has been
cured. In such circumstances, the law provides for relief by recourse to the Orphans' Court for the implementation of the doctrine known as "cy pres," a term derived from an old French
phrase meaning "as close as possible."
The cy pres doctrine, now codified in Pennsylvania law, 20 permits the court to approve a change in the terms of a trust to direct
it to purposes that are as close as reasonably possible to the
settlor's original intent and that are possible to fulfill. 21 In the
above example of the hospital, the court could permit the trust to
direct its funds and support to another nonprofit hospital in or
around the same area or to a charitable foundation committed to
helping the community served by the hospital.22
B.

Nonprofit Corporations- Diversion of Property

Unlike charitable trusts, nonprofit corporations generally are
not governed by a detailed fundamental instrument describing the
specifics of the organization's business and operations. In most
cases, a charitable nonprofit corporation will include in its Articles
of Incorporation a very brief summary of its purposes, which usually is as simple as a one or two sentence recitation of a purpose
authorized by section 5301 of the Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corpo-

20. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7740.3(a) (2006).
21, See also 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6110 (repealed by Act of July 7, 2006, 2006 Pa. Laws
98, § 3.2).
22, See In re Estate of Elkins, 888 A.2d 815 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 916
A.2d 1103 (Pa. 2007); In re Trust of Farrow, 602 A.2d 1346, 1347-48 (1992).
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ration Law. 23 While there may be somewhat more detailed statements of the purpose in other documents, such as the Form 1023
application for recognition of a federal tax exemption, the governing statement of purpose for the corporation will remain the summary in its Articles of Incorporation. A nonprofit corporation
must, of course, operate in accordance with its stated purpose, but
the statement is usually so broad and general that conformance to
it rarely presents significant problems. In most cases, the issue of
a charitable nonprofit corporation changing direction or purposes
falls under the simple directive of section 5547(b) of the Nonprofit
Corporation law, which provides:
Property committed to charitable purposes shall not, by any
proceeding under Chapter 59 (relating to fundamental
changes) or otherwise, be diverted from the objects to which it
was donated, granted or devised, unless and until the board of
directors or other body obtains from the court an order under
20 Pa. C.S. Ch. 61 (relating to estates) specifying the disposition of the property. 24
In some cases, the diversion of property covered by the law is
evident and the mandate of section 5547(b) very clear, so that recourse to the courts is obviously necessary. For example, when a
nonprofit community hospital sells its assets to a for-profit hospital system, the sale plainly diverts the assets sold from charitable
purposes. In such a situation, the parties commonly try to deal
with the issue of diversion by transferring assets or funds of a total value equal to those diverted to a charitable foundation established to serve the health care interests of the affected community.
While there are alternatives, no one seriously doubts the requirement of Orphans' Court approval of the arrangement.
Other situations can be considerably more difficult. Except for
sales to for-profit businesses, nonprofit corporations rarely transfer assets under circumstances that plainly constitute diversion
from charitable purposes. Hospitals do not usually sell significant
assets to environmental groups and health planning organizations
do not sell their businesses to churches. In most significant mergers or transfers between two nonprofit corporations, strict compliance with the precise language of section 5547(b) will not require
recourse to the Orphans' Court.
23. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 1995).
24. Id. § 5547(b).
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In 1996, the nonprofit Graduate Health System, Inc. transferred
by merger its hospitals to a nonprofit affiliate of the nonprofit and
charitable Allegheny hospital system. Although a very substantial and fundamental transaction, the transfer by merger of hospitals from one nonprofit health care system to another, in the same
community without any changes in operation or endowment or
restricted funds, did not constitute a diversion of property from its
charitable purposes and did not, under the specific language of
section 5547(b), require approval of the Orphans' Court.
As noted above, the Office of the Attorney General has issued its
Review Protocol at least in part to provide for scrutiny of major
transactions in the nonprofit health care sector that might escape
court review because of the limited practical application of section
5547(b). Notice under the Protocol, if given, will provide the Attorney General with sufficient information to consider challenging
a transaction that might not otherwise come before the court. As
also noted, however, the Protocol is not law or regulation.
No matter how the Office of the Attorney General views its Protocols and procedures in matters of possible diversion, neither the
Attorney General nor the court can change the law. If a transaction of any type does not divert the assets of a nonprofit corporation from the charitable purposes for which the assets were given,
nothing authorizes the Attorney General or the court to prevent or
change the transaction because the Attorney General does not
think it appropriate or believes that another use of the assets
might be preferable. Nothing in the Attorney General's parens
patriae status or powers gives the Attorney General the authority
to substitute his judgment for that of the board or trustees of a
nonprofit corporation acting in good faith. While common sense
usually calls for openness and cooperation with the Attorney General in matters involving fundamental transactions by nonprofit
corporations, nothing in the law requires common sense.
An increasingly common mechanism for nonprofit corporations
to deal with very substantial or fundamental transactions that do
not fall within the precise terms of section 5547(b) involves the
"seal of approval" proceeding. If a nonprofit corporation proposes
a significant arrangement that is not a true diversion of property,
it can satisfy the Attorney General and protect against subsequent
challenges by a petition to the Orphans' Court for a declaratory
judgment determining that the proposal, in fact, does not improperly divert property. The Attorney General and the courts have
not challenged the propriety of this type of action and generally
welcome the opportunity for advance scrutiny and evaluation. In
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1999, for example, Philadelphia Health Care Trust (PHCT)
changed its Articles of Incorporation in order to convert to a private foundation for purposes of federal taxes. Although the
change probably did not involve a diversion of assets covered by
section 5547(b), the issues and controversy surrounding the Allegheny bankruptcy and PHCT's former subsidiary hospitals of the
Graduate Hospital group made a cautious approach appropriate.
Thus, PHCT requested, and obtained after a hearing, a decree
confirming the propriety of its action and, as a practical matter,
insulating the action from further challenge or dispute, including
challenges by the Attorney General.
C.

Standing-

Who Asked You?

No issue relating to charities has attracted the attention of the
courts as much as the question of who has standing to challenge
before a court the operations, management, and other activities of
a charity. Charities control and give out a great deal of money.
Not surprisingly, many individuals, groups, and organizations
want some of that money and even consider themselves entitled to
it. When they do not receive it, they sometimes try to use the Orphans' Court to claim a right to it.
Charities do not owe a duty to individual members of the general public or to other groups or organizations as to how the charities use their assets and spend their money, and well- established
standing rules significantly limit who can participate as parties in
cases involving charities. In general, standing to challenge a charity before the Orphans' Court resides only with stated beneficiaries of the charity, members of the charity's duly constituted board
of directors or trustees or other governing body, the Attorney General, and parties with a genuine "special interest" that materially
25
exceeds the interest of the public.
Because only a very small group qualifies as direct beneficiaries
or trustees of a charity and there is only one Attorney General,
almost all standing disputes that reach the courts involve claims
of a special interest. The courts' definitions of a special interest
for standing tended to the conceptual and, in 1994, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the following:

25. See In re Milton Hershey Sch., 911 A.2d 1258, 1262-63 (Pa. 2006); Valley Forge
Historical Soc'y v. Washington Mem'l Chapel, 426 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Pa. 1981); In re Phila.
Health Care Trust, 872 A.2d 258, 261 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
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[T]he interest must have substance - there must be some
discernible adverse effect to some interest other than the abstract interest of all citizens in having others comply with the
law. That an interest be direct requires than an aggrieved
party must show causation of the harm to his interest by the
matter of which he complains. To find an immediate interest,
we examine the nature of the causal connection between the
action complained of and the injury to the person challenging
it.26

The most instructive cases on the meaning of the concept may
be those in which the courts denied standing, usually on the basis
that an interest shared with a portion of the public does not qualify as "special." On those grounds, the courts have found that parties with an interest in a charity that may appear substantial do
not have enough of a special interest for standing, so that the Society for the Advancement of the Deaf had no special interest in a
charitable trust established to benefit organizations that aid the
blind and deaf, 27 and the Milton Hershey School Alumni Associa-

tion did not have a special interest in the Milton Hershey School. 28
The Valley Forge Historical Society case probably provides the
best example of a special interest sufficient to confer standing. In
Valley Forge, a single settlor created both the Washington Memorial Chapel and the Valley Forge Historical Society for substantially the same purpose. The two organizations occupied the same
building for sixty years, and the Society made significant contributions to the Chapel. 29 In the litigation that lead to the supreme
court decision, the trustees of the Chapel decided to evict the Society from the Chapel building that both occupied. 30 The Society
sued to prevent the eviction, and the Chapel asserted that the Society lacked standing to challenge the action. The court, noting
the history and relationship of the organizations, found that the
Society had a special and immediate interest that would be directly affected by the proposed action of the Chapel that was materially different from the interests of any segment of the general

26. In re Francis Edward McGillick Found., 642 A.2d 467, 469 (Pa. 1994) (internal
quotation omitted).
27. In re Estate of Nevil, 199 A.2d 419, 423 (Pa. 1964).
28. Milton Hershey Sch., 911 A.2d at 1263.
29. Valley Forge,426 A.2d at 1125.
30. Id.
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public, and it concluded that the interest was sufficient to confer

standing. 31
When an attempt to intervene as a party on the basis of a special interest fails, as it usually does, the next and most likely final
resort involves a request to proceed in a case as amicus curiae. In
Pennsylvania, as in many states, amicus curiae is a difficult and
not easily-definable status. In the appellate courts of Pennsylvania, anyone can file a brief amicus curiae without leave of court,
although court approval is necessary to participate in oral argument. 32 Before the Court of Common Pleas and the Orphans'
Court division, the grant of amicus status rests entirely within the
discretion of the court, as does the role of amicus when the status
is approved. 33 For example, in the Barnes and in one of the Hershey cases, 34 Barnes students and Hershey alumni were given
amicus status after the denial of intervention as a party, while in
the PHCT proceedings, community groups denied intervention
35
were also denied amicus status.
An amicus curiae is not a party and, therefore, is not entitled to
assert claims, request relief, or raise new issues. 36 Once in a case,
however, the role of amicus can easily expand, so that the grant of
amicus status can involve a good deal more than the right to file a
brief. In the Barnes case, the three individuals granted amicus
status were ultimately given the authority to participate substantially as parties, with the right to review discovery, call witnesses
and produce testimony, cross examine witnesses, and object to the
introduction of evidence.
IV. THE DEVELOPING LAW
A.

The Barnes Decision

When Dr. Barnes established his art collection at his property in
Merion, Pennsylvania, he also set out detailed instructions for operation of the Foundation, its gallery, and its educational pro31. Id. at 1127-28.
32. PA.R.APP. P. 531.
33. Accord Wortham v. KarstadtQuelle AG (In re Nazi Era Cases Against German
Defendants Litig.), 153 F. App'x 819, 827 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that a trial court's decision
to accept or reject an amicus filing is entirely within the court's discretion); Waste Mgmt.,
Inc. v. City of York, 162 F.R.D. 34, 36 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
34. See In re Milton Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d 674, 679 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
35. See In re Phila. Health Care Trust, 872 A.2d 258, 259 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
36. See, e.g., Stilp v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 539, 556 n.14 (2006); Commonwealth v.
Tharp, 562 Pa. 231, 236 n.5 (2000).
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grams, down to a listing of job positions and salaries. He provided
for a five member board of trustees to govern the Foundation after
his and his wife's deaths, with one board member being nominated
by a bank and four by an educational institution. Shortly before
his death, Dr. Barnes designated Lincoln University, a historically
black institution located in a rural community outside of Philadelphia, as the nominating body for the four non-bank trustees.
By the late 1990's, a succession of lawsuits in state and federal
court over disputes with the Foundation's Merion neighbors and
zoning disputes involving visitation levels, traffic congestion, and
parking at the Foundation's gallery had depleted the Foundation's
small endowment (worth about $10 million at Dr. Barnes's death
in 1951). The restrictions on visitation placed on the Foundation
by local authorities also limited the Foundation's ability to raise
funds for its endowment and to expand its educational or art appreciation offerings.
In 2002, facing imminent financial collapse, the Foundation determined that the best possible means for reversing decline and
ensuring long term success in fulfilling Dr. Barnes's mission was
to deviate from some of the terms of the Foundation's governing
documents. In addition to modernizing many outdated provisions
in its bylaws, it looked to three major changes to its trust documents: (1) relocating its gallery from Merion to center city Philadelphia; (2) expanding its Board from five to fifteen members, with
the new members being nominated by the Board itself and not an
outside institution; and (3) enhancing public access to the Foundation's gallery. The Foundation filed a petition in the Orphans'
Court to invoke the "deviation doctrine," to authorize the changes.
The Petition generated considerable publicity and interest and,
not surprisingly, a number of individuals and groups claiming an
interest sought to intervene in the proceedings. Three Barnes
Foundation students claimed that the changes would damage Dr.
Barnes's educational vision; a separate charitable institution, the
de Mazia Trust, which had been formed following the death of Dr.
Barnes's prot6g6 Violette de Mazia, sought to join; and Lincoln
University, which believed itself entitled to nominate eighty percent of the trustees to the Foundation's Board, also asked to participate.
A few months after the petitions to intervene were filed, the Orphans' Court issued an opinion and decree denying all of the requests to intervene except for Lincoln's (which the Foundation had
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not opposed). 37 Shortly before the first hearing on the Foundation's petition in late 2003, the Foundation and Lincoln resolved
their disagreements, and Lincoln withdrew from the case. At that
point, another group of three students (which included one of the
students originally denied intervention) again asked to intervene,
as did the de Mazia Trust. The court again denied the requests to
intervene, reiterating that neither party had standing. The court
did, however, permit the three students to participate in the matter as amicus curiae. As discussed, the amici's role expanded
dramatically throughout the case, to the point where they effectively became a party and actively participated in the two hearings on the Foundation's petition. In December 2004, following
the second hearing, the Orphans' Court issued a decree and exten38
sive opinion, granting the Foundation all of the relief it sought.
In January 2005, one of the three students originally denied intervention (but not one of the amici) sought to appeal from the
court's final judgment. The Foundation, concerned that a delay in
obtaining final resolution of its requested changes would seriously
impact its ability to begin its financial turnaround, filed an extraordinary King's Bench Petition with the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The Foundation asked the court to take jurisdiction over the appeal (which was then pending in the Superior
Court) and summarily affirm the Orphans' Court's decree or dismiss the appeal as untimely. In April 2005, the Supreme Court
granted the Foundation's petition and, in a unanimous opinion,
held that the appeal was untimely, as the student had waited almost two years after his petition for intervention had been denied
39
before seeking to appeal that ruling.
B.

The Hershey Cases

Soon after he founded the Milton Hershey School, Milton Hershey directed the formation of a school alumni organization,
known as "the Milton Hershey School Alumni Association" for the
purpose of promoting the interests of the School. Since its incep37. See In re Barnes Found., 23 Fid. Rep. 2d 127 (Orphans' Ct. Montg. 2003).
38. See In re Barnes Found., 69 Pa. D. & C.4th 129 (Orphans' Ct. Montg. 2004).
39. In re Barnes Found., 871 A-2d 792, 795 (Pa. 2005). More than two years after the
supreme court's opinion, two new petitions were filed by parties, including Montgomery
County, seeking to reopen the prior proceedings and intervene. On May 15, 2008, the Orphans' Court dismissed these petitions for lack of standing. See In re Barnes Found., 28
Fid. Rep. 2d 258 (Orphans' Ct. Montg. 2008) (citing In re Milton Hershey Sch., 911 A.2d
1258 (Pa. 2006), and In re Phila. Health Care Trust, 872 A.2d 258 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005)).
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tion, the Association's membership has consisted only of former
students of the School, and it has operated from offices on School
property owned by the Trust. The Association is not, however,
formally affiliated with either the Hershey School or Hershey
Trust and it is not mentioned in any governing trust documents.
Although the Alumni Association enjoyed a good relationship
with the School over the years, the Association, at times, believed
that the trust was not managing its assets in the best interests of
the School. For example, in the 1990s, the Association, participating in court proceedings as an amicus curiae, successfully opposed
the Trust's plans to create the Catherine Hershey Institute of
Learning and Development. 40 Around the same time, the Association prodded the Attorney General to investigate allegations that
the Trust was diverting its assets from its primary purpose of
funding and operating the School. After a lengthy investigation,
the Attorney General concluded that the allegations were wellfounded and, following negotiations, the Attorney General, the
Trust, and the School entered into a consent decree governing the
Trust's activities going forward. The Association did not have a
formal role in the negotiations and was not a party to the eventual
agreement.
In 2002, the Trustees caused considerable controversy with a
proposal to sell the Trust's controlling interest in Hershey Foods
Corporation (successor to Hershey Chocolate Company). Finding
that the sale would likely not be in the best interests of the Trust
or the School, the Orphans' Court issued and the Commonwealth
Court affirmed a preliminary injunction against proceeding toward a sale, and the trustees did not pursue the matter further.
The sale proposal and court decisions led to changes in the governing boards of the trust and the School and to an agreement with
the Attorney General to modify the consent decree. 41 The Association, believing that the modified decree failed to provide the necessary protections guaranteeing fulfillment of the trust's central
purpose, filed a petition in the Orphans' Court for Dauphin
County seeking rescission of the new agreement, reinstatement of
the prior agreement, and appointment of a guardian ad litem and
a trustee ad litem. 42 The trial court granted the trust's and
School's preliminary objections contending that the Association
40. See Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d at 679.
41. See generally In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2002).
42. See In re Milton Hershey Sch., 911 A.2d 1258, 1260 (Pa. 2006).
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did not have standing to bring the action, but, in a 4-3 decision,
the Commonwealth Court sitting en banc reversed, holding that
the Association had the necessary "special interest" to bring its
43
action.
In a unanimous decision (with two justices not participating),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. The court began its
analysis with the principle that "[p]rivate parties generally lack
standing to enforce charitable trusts."44 Citing, among other
things, the Valley Forge case and a 1953 decision involving the
Barnes Foundation, 45 the court noted that only the Attorney General, "a member of the charitable organization, or someone having
a special interest in the trust" could bring an action to enforce a
charitable trust.46 The court then analyzed the question whether
the Association had the requisite "special interest" to confer standing on it.
The court compared the facts in the Hershey case unfavorably to
those in the Francis Edward McGillick Foundation and Valley
Forge cases. Distinguishing McGillick, in which the court had
held that the Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh had standing to sue a
Foundation with which the diocese had "integral involvement," the
court noted that the Association in Hershey did not have "any decision-making power or administration over" the trust. 47 The
court also rejected the Association's attempt to compare itself to
the Society in Valley Forge, which had standing because of its enduring and close relationship to the charitable institution at issue
there. According to the supreme court, the Association's relationship to the trust was distinguishable from the Society's relationship to the Chapel in Valley Forge because the Association was
created twenty years after the trust, and the trust's governing
documents were not amended to create a close relationship such
as existed in Valley Forge between the two institutions or to make
the Association an express beneficiary of the trust. 48
The court concluded with a sweeping rejection of the Association's purported basis for standing, which applies with equal force
to students and alumni seeking to intervene in the Barnes Foun-

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Hershey, 911 A.2d at 1260.
Id. at 1262.
Wiegand v. Barnes Found., 97 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1953).
Hershey, 911 A.2d at 1262.
Id.
Id. at 1262-63.
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dation cases, or community groups clamoring to participate in proceedings involving the Philadelphia Health Care Trust:
The Association's intensity of concern is real and commendable, but it is not a substitute for an actual interest. Standing
is not created through the Association's advocacy or its members' past close relationship with the School as former individual recipients of the Trust's benefits. The Trust did not
contemplate the Association, or anyone else, to be a "shadow
board" of graduates with standing to challenge actions the
49
Board takes.
C.

The PHCT Saga

In 1996, Graduate Health System, Inc., parent of the "Graduate" group of nonprofit hospitals mainly in the greater Philadelphia area, transferred the hospitals to components of the nonprofit
Allegheny Health System. Two years later, the Allegheny System
collapsed and filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Shortly
thereafter, Graduate Health System, having no further relationship with any Graduate institution and no operations, changed its
name to "Philadelphia Health Care Trust" and determined to
change the purposes in its Articles of Incorporation to function as
a private foundation. It concluded that the controversy surrounding the Allegheny System called for the presentation of the change
to the Orphans' Court for a full and open discussion and a "seal of
approval" determination that the change did not constitute a diversion of property under section 5547(b) of the Nonprofit Corporation law. After a contentious hearing and the objection of most
of the principal parties involved in the Allegheny case, the court
approved the change of purposes and issued the requested decree,
subject to a number of conditions including a requirement that
PHCT file accounts for five years. Although the court's decree
served the intended seal of approval purpose and foreclosed any
future objections to PHCT's conversion to a private foundation,
there followed seven years of efforts by an exceptionally diverse
collection of individuals and organizations to use the Orphans'
Court to obtain PHCT's money for themselves or to obtain the
right to direct how the money would be used.
A little more than a year after the conversion, PHCT reached a
tentative agreement for the phased transfer of its assets to the
49. Id. at 1263.
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health care components of the University of Pennsylvania. It filed
a petition with the Orphans' Court for the approval of the proposal, although the parties subsequently terminated their intended agreement and the petition was withdrawn. The petition
for approval of the arrangement with the University and the accounts filed by PHCT in accordance with the directive of the Decree of the Court approving private foundation status led to a barrage of petitions to intervene or participate in the Orphans' Court
proceedings. The putative intervenors sought to challenge PHCT's
proposed arrangements with the University of Pennsylvania and,
particularly, its use of its money.
The claimants attempting to join the PHCT proceedings in the
Orphans' Court included an unemployment program project, a
senior citizens alliance, a mental health/mental retardation center, a hospital system, a Pennsylvania state senator, a Philadelphia city councilman, the director of a Philadelphia city consumer
agency, and a local university. While the petitioners and claimants stated their positions in different words and with different
factual and legal justifications, they all asserted basically the
same claim-each did not like how PHCT used its assets and each
wanted to take the assets for itself or to control how the assets
were used.
In trying to find a way into the Orphans' Court proceedings,
each of the petitioners asserted some variation of a claim to standing on the basis of a special interest. The community groups
claimed a special relationship to the community served by PHCT's
purposes; the health institutions asserted that they served the
communities intended to be beneficiaries of PHCT's purposes; the
political figures raised their roles as elected representatives of the
community; and one petitioner even argued that it was the true
successor of the rightful charitable owner of PHCT's funds. All of
the petitioners requested intervention as parties and three also
asked for amicus curiae status.
In proceedings over the course of several years, the Orphans'
Court dismissed all of the petitions, denying all requests for intervention or appointment as amicus curiae. Some of the petitioners
appealed the final group of dismissals, and the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court affirmed the ruling of the Orphans' Court
and the dismissal of the petitions. In its opinion, the Commonwealth Court stated:
In Pennsylvania, standing requires that "an aggrieved party
have an interest which is substantial, direct, and immediate.
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That is, the interest must have substance - there must be
some discernible adverse effect to some interest other than
the abstract interest of all citizens in having others comply
with the law." Although appellants attempt to establish that
waste and diversion of assets constitute issues of social concern, such by itself is insufficient for purposes of demonstrating standing under [In re Francis Edward McGillick Found.,
537 Pa. 194, 642 A.2d 467 (1994)]. Furthermore, Appellants
fail to specifically articulate how their interests are mutually
exclusive or distinct from the public interest already being
50
represented by the Attorney General.
As to the requests to become amicus curiae, the Orphans' Court
stated:
The proceedings now before this Court do not raise issues of
broad social concern .... Accounts have been filed. The Attorney General has filed Objections to said Accounts. Said
Objections include many of the complaints of the Petitioners.
Prosecution of said Objections may result in the surcharge or
removal of members of the Board of Directors of PHCT. The
Petitioners are free to raise their concerns to the Attorney
General. They are free to offer their resources, and the fruits
of their investigations, to the Attorney General. They are free
to consult and work with the Attorney General. Under all of
the foregoing circumstances, this Court sees no need to appoint the Petitioners, or any of them, to serve as Amicus Cu51
riae.
The PHCT decisions confirm both the rules and concepts of
standing before the Orphans' Court in matters involving a charity.
The court rejected every claim, category, and variation of the concept of special interest that each of the petitioners could conjure
up, and it denied all of the efforts to circumvent the standing rules
by amicus curiae status. While imaginative future petitioners will
undoubtedly find some basis to claim a special interest in a charity that the petitioners did not utilize in the PHCT cases, they will
not find many, and few petitioners who do not have a true close

50. Phila. Health Care Trust, 872 A.2d at 262-63 (citations omitted).
51. In re Phila. Health Care Trust, 2004 Phila. Ct. Com. P1. LEXIS 113, at *15-*16
(Orphans' Ct. July 19, 2004), aff/d, 872 A.2d 258 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
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connection to a charity will find a basis to claim a special interest
that the Orphans' Court in PHCThas not rejected.
The PHCT cases send a clear message solidly confirmed by the
supreme court in Hershey. Despite the unique circumstances of
the amici curiae in the Barnes proceedings, the standing rules remain firmly in place. Community groups, related charitable institutions, elected officials, government agencies, and members of
the population served by charities may have a good faith interest
in how a charity operates and spends its money, but that interest
involves some variation of the interest of the community or the
citizenry in general. Only the Attorney General serves as parens
patriae, and only the Attorney General may represent the community and the citizenry before the Orphans' Court. Others who
consider themselves interested, affected, or even aggrieved, may
present their positions to the Attorney General. They do not have
standing before the Orphans' Court.
V. CONCLUSION

Charities live and operate in a different world than businesses
conducted for profit for the benefit of shareholders, members, or
other equity holders. Most charities, and particularly large charities, do conduct a species of business and must make business decisions about operations, finance, risks, and rewards and most of
the other things that concern every business. In making those
decisions, however, charities act for, and are responsible to, a very
different constituency and are governed by very different standards than for-profit businesses, and that makes a very big difference.
As the designation makes clear, for-profit businesses operate to
make a profit for their shareholders. Charities operate to pursue
their charitable purposes for the benefit of the public or the community. Shareholders protect themselves individually or as a
group and have recourse to the state or federal court systems
when wronged. The Attorney General protects the public and the
citizens of the state and has recourse on behalf of the public to the
Orphans' Court when he considers the public wronged.
The Attorney General naturally plays a very important part in
any proceeding or action relating to a major transaction by a charity. He has the right and standing to participate as a party in all
aspects of any proceeding before a court and the right to object to
or challenge any proposed action or transaction. The Orphans'
Court also protects the interests of the public and naturally takes
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the positions of the Attorney General very seriously. Any charity
contemplating a major transaction or other significant activity
would do well to disclose everything of significance to the Office of
the Attorney General and to keep it up to date.
Decisions by charities as to whether and how to proceed before
the Orphans' Court depend on the nature of the proposal under
consideration. Some matters, like deviation and cy pres, dissolution, and material change of purpose, require approval by the
court and leave no room for discretion. Others, such as nondiversion of property by nonprofit corporations, usually are not as clear
and often involve some discretion and may depend on factors such
as the visibility of the case, the likely size and intensity of possible
opposition to the proposal, and the position of the Attorney General.
In deciding whether to present a matter to the court, charities
should consider that the Orphans' Court differs in a number of
potentially important respects from the civil division of the Court
of Common Pleas and other trial level courts. Petitions before the
Orphans' Court may not need to follow the traditional forms of
adversary pleading, and petitioners have reasonable latitude in
framing the issues presented. The standing rules often keep out
of proceedings the most virulent opponents, and the Attorney
General, most often the only opposing party, has no personal stake
in the matter and can thus often be more reasonable than a true
adversarial litigant. The moderately permissive procedures of the
court in proceedings involving only the court and the Attorney
General can allow for a more reasoned consideration of the issue
and evaluation of reasonable alternatives. Finally, a decree of the
Orphans' Court, subject of course to any appeals, settles a matter
and ends all meaningful opposition. It allows a transaction or activity to proceed with the usually unbreakable seal of approval.

